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ABSTRACT
Game theory is appropriate for studying cyber conflict be-
cause it allows for an intelligent and goal-driven adversary.
Applications of game theory have led to a number of results
regarding optimal attack and defense strategies. However,
the overwhelming majority of applications explore overly
simplistic games, often ones in which each participant’s ac-
tions are visible to every other participant. These simplifi-
cations strip away the fundamental properties of real cyber
conflicts: probabilistic alerting, hidden actions, unknown
opponent capabilities.
In this paper, we demonstrate that it is possible to ana-
lyze a more realistic game, one in which different resources
have different weaknesses, players have different exploits,
and moves occur in secrecy, but they can be detected. Cer-
tainly, more advanced and complex games are possible, but
the game presented here is more realistic than any other
game we know of in the scientific literature. While optimal
strategies can be found for simpler games using calculus,
case-by-case analysis, or, for stochastic games, Q-learning,
our more complex game is more naturally analyzed using
the same methods used to study other complex games, such
as checkers and chess. We define a simple evaluation func-
tion and employ multi-step searches to create strategies. We
show that such scenarios can be analyzed, and find that in
cases of extreme uncertainty, it is often better to ignore one’s
opponent’s possible moves. Furthermore, we show that a
simple evaluation function in a complex game can lead to
interesting and nuanced strategies.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Computers connected to the Internet are potential targets
for criminals, botnets, and national cyber capabilities. Cy-
ber conflicts result from competing interests struggling to
control the same assets. If one side of the conflict is manu-
ally assessing the situation, reasoning about the risks, mak-
ing decisions, and executing attacks it will likely be over-
whelmed if the other side adopts an automated approach
in which algorithms are used to make every choice. The
speed of human-in-the-loop decision making is likely to be
several orders of magnitude slower than a well tuned algo-
rithm. The future of cyber offense and defense undoubtedly
depends on the development of advanced, scalable, and effec-
tive algorithms for decision-making in real-time. Moreover,
the organization that first masters this technology will likely
obtain a decisive advantage over their adversaries.
A number of challenges remain before effective cyber con-
flict decision algorithms can be developed. Current methods
lack a framework with which to automate reactions in real-
istic scenarios. In particular, what are relevant assets and
capabilities? How can they be used? What is the relative
benefit of each choice? And, given answers to these ques-
tions, how can the best actions be chosen and coordinated?
These questions are the province of game theory.
In this paper, we take a game-theoretic approach to de-
veloping a prototype for intelligent, automated attack and
defense. Previous work in this direction has analyzed sim-
plified abstractions of cyber situations. We go further in this
work by (1) creating a new game, HackAttack, that can be
used to model larger, more complex conflicts than previous
work, and (2) comparing and analyzing a number of strate-
gies for HackAttack. These strategies use tree searches to
maximize an evaluation function. We show that a simple
evaluation function in a complex game can lead to interest-
ing and nuanced strategies. This provides a promising path
forward for developing a method for intelligent cyber conflict
automation.
In Section 2, we review the extensive literature on applica-
tions of game theory to cyber security, and emphasize how
this work extends it. In Section 3, we introduce our new
game, HackAttack, and describe its rules and concepts in
detail. To play the game, the player strategies are created
using tree searches and an evaluation function, which are
described in Section 4. Strategies are analyzed in simulated
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games, as described in Section 5. In Section 6 we summa-
rize the lessons learned and implications for future work in
regards to searching trees to select moves in cyber conflicts.
We summarize our conclusions in Section 7.
2. BACKGROUND
An extensive literature now exists that analyzes cyber se-
curity using game theory. However, there has been very
little work analyzing realistic games. Games can be catego-
rized by various independent dimensions: static or dynamic,
complete or incomplete, perfect or imperfect. Static games
are games in which the order of the moves do not matter;
these are generally viewed as games where the players move
simultaneously. Non-static, or dynamic, games are more re-
alistic for modeling cyber conflict. In a game of complete
information, each player knows the payoff function of each
of the other players, whereas this is not the case for games
of incomplete information. Finally, in games of perfect in-
formation, each player observes (without error) all actions
taken and their outcomes. A notable feature of cyber conflict
is that each agent attempts to remain undetected; games
where actions or outcomes may be unobserved or observed
with error or uncertainty are called games of imperfect in-
formation. In this paper, we develop a dynamic game of
complete but imperfect information. For useful surveys that
describe the literature along this taxonomy, see [8] and [15].
A number of researchers have studied (or primarily fo-
cused on) static games, such as [2, 4, 5, 9]. These games
have the significant advantage that they can be analyzed
(e.g., Nash equilibria can be computed) using existing meth-
ods. In some cases (e.g., [12]) the repeated game is studied,
which adds some realism, but fails to capture the essence of
cyber attacks where a sequence of small gains may lead to
a dominant position.
Among dynamic games, it is common to assume perfect
information where each player can observe the actions of
the others. For example, in [10, 12, 14, 16, 19], attacks are
always detected. This renders the results inapplicable to real
cyber conflicts, since cyber attacks are often undetected.
Almost all work involving dynamic games with imperfect
information focuses on so-called stochastic games. In these
games (e.g., [1, 11, 13, 17, 22]), there is a finite state space,
and transition probabilities are determined by the simul-
taneous move choices made by the players. Special meth-
ods have been developed to find optimal strategies for these
games, such as the Q-Learning method [6] and methods from
competitive Markov Decision Processes [3]. However, these
methods scale poorly with problem size, so we adopt differ-
ent methods in this work.
The survey [15] describes the lack of realism in cyber
games as a key issue in previous research.
Some of the limitations of the present research
are: (a) Current stochastic game models only
consider perfect information and assume that the
defender is always able to detect attacks; (b)
Current stochastic game models assume that the
state transition probabilities are fixed before the
game starts . . . ; (c) Current game models assume
that the players’ actions are synchronous, which
is not always realistic; (d) Most models are not
scalable with the size and complexity of the sys-
tem under consideration.
In this work, we address the first three of these concerns.
One issue all previous games have is that payoff functions
must be assigned to certain outcomes. These numbers typ-
ically must be chosen to represent some intuitive notion of
the benefit of each outcome, but the payoffs, being very dif-
ficult to validate, must generally be accepted as notional.
In our game, we instead define a win condition. Namely,
the attacker who owns the most assets at the end of a given
number of time steps is the winner. This view of the payoff
directly correlates with the real-world goals of attackers and
is therefore more defensible.
Another key distinction is that all previous work we are
aware of analyzes an attacker-defender situation. We ana-
lyze a two-attacker situation where two adversaries are at-
tempting to control a common pool of resources. This allows
for a symmetry in the strategies and avoids having to con-
struct two different kinds of strategies (i.e., attackers and
defenders). Consequently, the analysis and comparison of
strategies is simplified. Also, adding defenders at a future
time will be possible by augmenting the game with owner-
ship and defensive moves (e.g., clean-booting).
Furthermore, the complexity of our game makes it very
difficult to use the strategy optimization methods popular
in the literature. Instead, we adopt the strategy analysis
methods used in games such as chess. These include using
an evaluation function and performing k-ply searches, as
described in [7, 20].
3. HACKATTACK
We developed the game, HackAttack, specifically for this
research to simplify cyber conflict into an analyzable game
while avoiding oversimplification. In HackAttack, players
battle over a pool of resources, similar to how two actors
might attempt to grow their botnets. The winner is the
player who has the most computers after a set time frame.
The game is turn based in a fixed player order, and players
take one action each turn for each resource they control. The
resources are a collection of “neutral” computers accessible
from the Internet.
The rules of this game apply to any number of players,
and the game has been played with up to five players to
test the game mechanics. However, for the purposes of this
analysis, only two players were used.
Computers and Accounts. The game is played with 5p
computers where p is the number of players. For example,
in a two-player game, there are 10 available computers. Each
player has a starting computer on which they have one ac-
count. Accounts represent the presence a player has on a
computer. Each player begins with one account on their
starting computer More accounts make it easier to remove
the other player off a computer and to resist being removed
off a computer. We say that a player controls a computer if
they have at least one account on it. The most accounts any
player can have on any machine is four. Multiple players can
have a presence on a computer, with each of them having
up to four accounts on it at the same time.
Exploits. Exploits are named by the operating system
(OS) they target and their power level. At the start of the
game, computers are randomly, but equiprobably designated
a certain OS, indicated by four types, 0 through 3. (These
can be thought to stand for Linux, Mac, Solaris, and Win-
dows, for example, but the specific labels have no bearing
on the game.)
The power levels for an exploit range from 0 to 14. The
chance of getting an exploit with power level n is 2−(n+1).
Therefore an exploit with power 0 has a 50% chance of being
found, an exploit with power 1 a 25% chance, all the way
to exploits with power 14, which has about a 0.003% chance
of being found1. Each player starts out with four exploits,
and there is a 1/6 chance of gaining a random exploit each
round.
Vulnerabilities and Patches. Computers at the start of
the game are patched against three exploits, unknown to
the players, representing the antivirus software the host user
already has. These patches are chosen with the same proba-
bility as the exploits for players; weaker ones are more com-
mon.
Actions. On their turn, each player gets to assign one
action to each computer they control. Actions are types of
attacking, defending, and scouting. These moves are sum-
marized in Table 1.
Attacking, in the game called hacking, is using an exploit
to gain one account on a computer. An exploit for a specific
OS only works for that one OS. Exploits are the only form of
attack, and using different exploits is the only way to change
how you attack. If the hacking succeeds, the one carrying
out the hack gains an account on the target machine. A
successful hack puts one account on the computer targeted,
up to the maximum number of accounts. If the hacking
fails, the attacker learns no additional information about
the target.
Defense is accomplished by patching to decrease the like-
lihood of an opponent successfully attacking your computer,
cleaning to remove your opponent from a computer, or
backdooring to making it harder for you to be removed off
a computer. Backdooring puts one more account on a com-
puter that you own. Cleaning removes enemy accounts off a
computer equal to the accounts you have on that computer.
Removing a player from a computer is important because
only computers with at least one player account on it will
count toward a player’s final computer total. After clean-
ing, you know how many enemy accounts were removed.
The different outcomes of this have varying meanings, and
certain results make it unclear if the opponent is still on the
computer. Cleaning is especially useful after you detect an
opponent using that machine. Patching makes a computer
you own permanently safe against an exploit you choose.
Since you only know about the exploits you own and use to
hack, you can only patch exploits you own. One downside
of patching is that if you patch an exploit and are later re-
moved from the computer, then you cannot use the exploit
you patched to get back on that computer.
The scouting functions, scanning and reconning, reveal
information about a computer. Scanning tells you who else,
if anyone, is on the targeted computer you own and the
amount of accounts they have on it. It may be used before
cleaning to know if your clean will entirely remove your
opponent. Unlike cleaning, scanning tells you definitively
if someone else is on a computer and if they will remain
after a clean. Reconning one computer from a controlled
computer tells you the OS of the targeted computer and
what exploits you have, if any, that can hack it, but it does
not indicate whether it is already occupied. This action is
used to set up a hack on the following turn because it can
1Technically, the probabilities are then normalized to sum
to 1 by dividing by (100 - 0.003)%.
almost guarantee the hack’s success. If you are cleaned off
that computer and want to get back on, you would not need
to recon again because you would remember the computer’s
OS.
Detection. It is important to note that each player only
observes another player’s action if it is “detected”. Oth-
erwise, they are aware only of their own actions and the
results of those actions. Every action, therefore, has a de-
tection probability based on how much it interacts with the
computer. Patching has a 25% detection rate, hacking
20%, backdooring 15%, reconning 5%, scanning 30%, and
cleaning 100%. One important thing to note is that you
can be detected by a player on the targeted machine, and, in
the case of hacking and reconning, on the acting computer.
Win Condition. After 20 rounds, the player controlling
the greatest number of computers is the winner, or a tie
is declared if each player controls the same number of ma-
chines. A game is stopped early if one player is cleaned off
of every computer. Having at least one account on a com-
puter makes it contribute to your total number of machines
controlled at the end of the twenty rounds, and both players
can have the same computer count toward their totals.
4. STRATEGIES
A strategy for a game is a function that takes as input a
player’s situation and returns that player’s move(s). There
are many ways to develop strategies. A common approach
in the cyber security game theory literature is to explicitly
write down the objective function and then directly derive
optimal solutions. This approach works well only in the sim-
plest games, such as static matrix games. For more complex
games, such as stochastic Markov games, alternative meth-
ods (e.g., Q-Learning) can be used [1]. However, the most
complex games must adopt methods similar to those used to
develop strategies for checkers and chess. These approaches
involve the development and use of evaluation functions to
score the desirability of any possible state of the game. The
evaluation function is a formalization of expert intuition on
what constitutes a good position. For example, in the game
of chess, it may include points for material, controlling the
center of the board, having freedom to move, and so on. The
evaluation function is then used in a multiple look-ahead tree
search to select the best move to play.
As a simple example, a possible tic-tac-toe evaluation
function is described in Figure 1. Such an evaluation func-
tion can then be used to consider what-if scenarios and select
a move. For example, Figure 1 shows a board and two possi-
ble moves that have been scored according to this evaluation
function. This approach suggests that the second move is
preferable to the first.
In practice, however, it can be very difficult to engineer
an evaluation function that fully captures the intricacies of
the game. The value of a game state depends on the possi-
ble responses by the opponents. For example, points could
be added if a good move could be possible on the next turn
and subtracted if the opponent can make a good move. The
combinatorial possibilities make such an evaluation function
difficult to define and harder to tune. Rather than attempt
to construct a highly complex evaluation function, an alter-
native method is to “look several moves ahead” by searching
a tree of subsequent possible.
As shown in Figure 2, a tree is constructed top-down start-
ing with the current board configuration as the root. For
Attack
Hacking Use an exploit from one computer to gain an account on another 20% P.D. Remote
Defense
Backdooring Add more ways to control a computer 15% P.D. Local
Cleaning Remove other player’s accounts from a computer 100% P.D. Local
Patching Block all future uses of an exploit on a computer 25% P.D. Local
Scouting
Reconning Identify a computer’s OS and vulnerabilities 5% P.D. Remote
Scanning Use an account on a computer to find the presence of other players 30% P.D. Local
Table 1: Summary of available moves in HackAttack. PD = Probability of Detection. Hacking and recon affect
a targeted computer from a controlled computer. The other actions affect the controlled computer itself.
Figure 1: An evaluation function for scoring the tic-
tac-toe board for player X could be defined by grant-
ing 4 points for each open two-in-a-row that X has,
subtracting 1 for each one O has, subtracting 1 point
if O occupies the center, and adding 3 points for each
corner occupied by X. According to this evaluation
function, X would prefer Move 2 to Move 1 since it
has a higher score.
Figure 2: A 2-ply tree search explores all moves,
starting from an input state, to create the middle
layer of the tree. From each of those states, all
possible opponent moves are considered. The leaf
nodes are then scored by the evaluation function.
The middle layers are assigned a score, not from the
evaluation function applied to their states, but as
the minimum of their children’s scores. The root
node is given the maximum of its children’s scores.
In this case the best move would be Move 1, since
it was the source of the high score.
each possible move, a child node is created. This makes up
the 1-ply tree. Then, at each leaf, each opponent move is
added as a child, making up the 2-ply tree. This process
continues to the desired depth. At the bottom, each board
configuration is scored according to the evaluation function.
These scores are then rolled up as follows. If the last move
represents the player’s move then, under the assumption
that the player will try to improve the board, the maxi-
mum of the childs’ scores are assigned to the parent. On the
other hand, if the last move represents the opponent’s move
then the minimum is used. This process is repeated up the
tree, alternating between min and max. The score given to
the root is the largest value among its children (which may
occur multiple times). One of these highest-scoring moves is
then selected. This is the k-ply strategy for the given evalu-
ation function. Evaluation functions and k-ply search trees
have been used to analyze a wide variety of games [7].
The basic k-ply strategy assumes that all possible moves
are known and deterministic. It also assumes that each
player gets one move. In HackAttack, results are proba-
bilistic and the number of moves a player gets next turn de-
pends on the outcome of their move this turn. Furthermore,
each player has only limited knowledge of the other play-
ers’ knowledge, accounts, and exploits. This lack of knowl-
edge makes it very difficult to consider the opponent’s best
move; that would require the computationally intractable
problem of branching over all possible assets the opponent
may have and averaging the results according to the prob-
abilities. Consequently, we adopted some simplifying as-
sumptions and explored two different kinds of k-ply search:
Random-Response and No-Response.
In a Random-Response k-ply search, the opponent’s move
is modeled as being randomly chosen from all possible moves.
The probability of each move is weighed by the probability
that the opponent would have the resources to carry out the
move, according to the player’s knowledge. To this end, each
player’s knowledge of the other player had to be tracked,
which is described below.
In a No-Response k-ply search, the opponent moves are
not considered. Each level of the tree contains the next
possible moves for the player. This approach has the dis-
advantage of not being able to account for enemy choices.
However, in HackAttack, often very little is known about
the enemy and their resources, which makes it difficult to
respond meaningfully. In this tree search, each node is as-
signed the maximum score of its children nodes. The main
advantage of the No-Response k-ply search is that it is pos-
sible to develop more elaborate (i.e., multi-step) plans. The
name No-Response indicates that it plans ahead as if no re-
sponse will be brought against its actions, but the strategy
itself can still respond to its opponent. For example, if a
successful hack is detected, it could decide to clean that
computer in response.
In HackAttack, a player is allowed one move for each com-
puter on which they have at least one account. This means
that a player with, say, 5 accounts, would have an enormous
number of possible moves. This combinatorial explosion
slows the tree search and makes it impractical for analysis.
To avoid this issue, we consider a single computer at a time.
A tree is created for the moves from that computer, and the
best move is chosen. The result of that move is then used
as the starting point of a tree search for the next computer.
This approach is less thorough and may miss some possibil-
ities for coordinating actions, but it turns a multiplicative
work factor into an additive one.
The information at each node in the search tree is a knowl-
edge structure. It contains four tables of probabilities indi-
cating the player’s degree of belief in various claims. The
probabilities are updated using Bayes’s Theorem when the
player observes something (e.g., the result of their action
or the detection of an opponent’s action). The first table
gives the probability of each host having a particular OS.
The second table tracks the probability of each machine be-
ing patched against each exploit. The third table provides
the probability of player p having r accounts on computer
c. The last table contains the probability that player p has
each possible exploit.
The use of a k-ply tree search requires the specification
of an evaluation function. For the purposes of this research,
we used a “net-computers” evaluation function, which is the
number of computers the player has accounts on minus the
expected (in the probabilistic sense) number of computers
the opponent has. (The expected number is used because
the exact number is not known to the players.)
5. RESULTS
Each of four strategies were tested against each of the
others with each strategy going first or second in ten games
for each configuration. The four strategies are (1) Random,
which picks a legal move uniformly at random, (2) One-
Step, is a 1-ply search that looks at only the first move, (3)
Random-Response, which looks two moves ahead and mod-
els the opponent’s move as Random, and (4) No-Response,
which considers making two of its own moves and ignores
the opponent’s response. All four methods use the net-
computers evaluation function. Table 2 summarizes these
pairwise results.
The results show that Random is the worst strategy and
that No-Response is the best against the strategies tested.
One-Step and Random-Response performed comparably and
evenly split wins when pitted against each other. They
both lost approximately the same number of games to No-
Response. However, the Random-Response strategy won
more often against Random than One-Step did. In sum-
mary, the strategy rankings are, from best to worst:
1. No-Response,
2. Random-Response,
3. One-Step, and
Strategy for P1 Strategy for P2 Wins Ties
P1 P2
Random One-Step 3 6 1
One-Step Random 5 2 3
Random Rand-Response 0 9 1
Rand-Response Random 8 0 2
Random No-Response 2 8 0
No-Response Random 10 0 0
One-Step Rand-Response 4 6 0
Rand-Response One-Step 5 5 0
One-Step No-Response 2 7 1
No-Response One-Step 7 3 0
Rand-Response No-Response 3 7 0
No-Response Rand-Response 9 1 0
Table 2: Results from comparing each pair of strate-
gies in ten games each. The winning strategy is
shown in bold text.
4. Random.
There appears to be no real benefit to any strategy to going
first. We next extract general trends and observations from
the games of each non-random strategy.
5.1 One-Step Strategy
One-Step mostly chose hacking moves. When it did not,
it chose cleaning. It cleans if it has detected a successful
attack. It may clean on the first round if it only has low-
power attacks (e.g., level 0 or 1). Third, it may choose to
clean if many rounds have passed. This behavior follows
from direct application of the evaluation function. In gen-
eral, the strategy chooses a move if it is the most likely way
to either increase the number of computers it has accounts
on, or to decrease the number of computers the opponent
has accounts on. Since cleaning has a 100% chance of suc-
cess in this game, it is an ideal move when another player is
known to be on a shared computer. Hence, it follows that
the strategy will clean when it detects a successful attack,
but not on failed attacks. In the case where no powerful at-
tacks exist, the slight chance that an opponent has started on
the same machine as the player means that cleaning, which
works with 100% probability, is more likely to improve the
net-computers evaluation function than attempting to hack
another computer. Similarly, if the prospects for a success-
ful attack are very low (e.g., the best exploit has only power
level 1), then cleaning is more likely to improve the eval-
uation function because the knowledge structure models a
slight chance that the opponent is on the same machine at
the start. In a third case of using the clean action, after
several rounds, the strategy has tried enough hacks to de-
duce that the probability of any attack working on the as-yet
unexploited machines is very low. It then follows that the
better option is to clean the machines it does have access
to.
When hacking, the highest-power exploits are used first.
If these exploits fail, then other exploits will be attempted.
A common pattern is to attempt to hack a computer us-
ing the best available exploit, and if it fails, to then hack
the same computer using the next best available exploit for
a different OS. Probabilistically, this makes sense. When
a powerful hack fails, it provides significant evidence that
the OS it assumed was incorrect. The probability of that
powerful attack succeeding on another computer is about
25% because that computer must have the right OS (a 25%
chance) for it to succeed. However, if another powerful at-
tack for another OS is available, its probability of success on
the same computer is around 33% because one of the other
OSs have already been ruled out. In contrast, if only one
powerful attack is available, the strategy will try that exploit
wherever it can. Only after it has been tried everywhere will
the next, in this case weak, exploit be attempted.
This leads to an overall strategy that takes into account
the power of the exploits available. It can be summarized
as follows. First, if only weak exploits are available, begin
by cleaning the machine the player begins on. Second,
hack each machine with the best available exploit. On each
machine where this fails, hack that machine with the next
best powerful exploits. Also, upon successful detection of
a hack, clean the hacked computer. When the chance of
successfully hacking additional computers is sufficiently low,
proceed defensively and clean each controlled computer on
each subsequent turn.
5.2 Random-Response Strategy
The Random-Response strategy follows many of the same
guidelines as does the One-Step strategy regarding when it
cleans on the first round, how it selects exploits to use in
hacks, and the fact that it never uses the scouting moves
(recon and scan). When one powerful exploit is available,
the Random-Response strategy, like the One-Step strategy,
will continually try that exploit until it has been tried on
every computer (excluding the computer it begins the game
on).
One key difference between the Random-Response and the
One-Step is that in the Random-Response strategy, a com-
puter is cleaned the first turn after it has been succesfully
hacked into. Also, computers are cleaned periodically after
a certain amount of time.
These slight changes make Random-Response a slightly
more defensive strategy than One-Step. This difference fol-
lows because as the strategy considers its opponents possible
moves, it recognizes that there is a possibility it could get
cleaned off its newly acquired computer. While this can-
not be prevented immediately, a cleaning move on the next
available turn is the best defense against it.
This slight difference made this strategy more effective
against the Random strategy. Unlike One-Step, which lost
when its opponent had a powerful attack, Random-Response
managed to win even in those cases. For example, in one
game where the Random strategy had a power level 9 ex-
ploit, the Random-Response strategy was able to keep it in
check by judicious use of cleaning moves, and ended up
winning the game.
5.3 No-Response Strategy
The No-Response strategy behaved fundamentally differ-
ently from the other strategies. Because it looked ahead at
two of its own moves, it was able to value recon actions
much more highly than the other strategies did. This fol-
lows because a randomly chosen hack, even with a powerful
exploit, has at most a 25% chance of success. As a result, a
new computer would be gained approximately every fourth
move. In contrast, a recon move reveals the OS of the target
machine. Knowing the OS, the probability of success may
be much higher, near one if a good exploit is available for
that OS. So a recon-hack combination should yield a new
computer at approximately every second move, making it
the preferable strategy.
When the No-Response strategy applies exploits, it ap-
plies whichever exploit is indicated to be effective by the
recon. This makes it fundamentally different than the One-
Step and Random-Response strategies, which will generally
choose the most powerful exploits first.
As the number of viable targets are reduced by exploration
and exploitation, the strategy veers toward a defensive pos-
ture. This includes a combination of backdooring, clean-
ing, and (occassionally) scanning. The cleaning makes
sense for the same reasons it was used by One-Step and
Random-Response (e.g., after detection of successful attack
and when few viable targets remain). The difference here
is that looking the extra step ahead brings into play the
relevance of the number of accounts. A cleaning is not
guaranteed to remove the opponent from the computer since
the opponent may have more accounts than the player. To
know for sure that the opponent is eliminated, one can first
scan to find out how many accounts there are, and then, if
the opponent does not have more accounts than the player
has, a cleaning will eliminate the opponent. Additionally,
a backdoor strengthens the player’s hold on the computer
and makes a subsequent clean move more effective.
A typical game for the No-Response strategy involves a
sequence of recon moves until a vulnerability is found, and
then a successful hack move is made. As the position evolves,
the strategy becomes more defensive and combines its ongo-
ing offensive campaign with defensive backdoor, clean, and
scan actions.
6. DISCUSSION
Our experiments produced both expected and unexpected
outcomes. It was expected, and the experiments showed,
that deeper tree searches yield better performance. In par-
ticular, the Random strategy, effectively a 0-ply search, per-
forms the worst, as expected. Still, it manages to defeat the
other strategies occasionally when it starts the game with
a powerful exploit. Furthermore, the 1- and 2-ply searches
outperformed the 0-ply search. Unfortunately, due to the
large breadth of possible moves, searches of depth three or
more were intractable with the available computational re-
sources; this is discussed below.
Other results were unexpected. Not only did the same
evaluation functions lead to different strategies, but each in-
dividual strategy produced a nuanced variation in tactics
depending on the power and variety of exploits it begins
with. In general, more powerful exploits lead to more agres-
sive play (more attacks), and weaker exploits lead to more
defensive play (more securing of controlled computers). This
shows that the complexity of realistic cyber conflict may not
require complex algorithms. Instead, a simple evaluation
function and a k-ply search may suffice to produce highly
effective, robust, and nuanced strategies.
Another unexpected result was the clear dominance of
the No-Response strategy over the Random-Response strat-
egy. This shows that, in this example of extreme uncer-
tainty about the opponent’s situation, it is more effective
to consider one’s own moves only. Attempting to average or
search over a wide range of opponent moves when each move
has only a very small probability only seems to help avoid
“knock-out” moves. (For example, the Random-Response
strategy was more likely than the others to clean a newly ac-
quired computer, apparently in order to avoid being cleaned
off by the other opponent should they have happened to be
on there first. This observation adds credibility to the anal-
ysis of risk from unilateral actions common in the literature,
such as in attack trees [18], attack graphs [21], and attack
Petri nets [23].
The main shortcoming of this approach is the fact that the
exploration of moves in a k-ply search tree is very slow and
scales exponentially with k. This made it impossible to ex-
plore the implications of deeper searches. However, a num-
ber of methods for accelerating and deepening the search are
available. For example, in early rounds of the game, there
is typically a symmetry among unexplored computers in the
sense that what is known about each of them is the same.
As a result, they lead to the same scores being computed
for moves on each of those computers. Rather than simply
compute all of those scores in the tree, the symmetry in the
knowledge can be exploited to drastically reduce the explo-
ration required. Another approach to speed up the search
involves being more judicious on which branches of the tree
to explore. For example, if a first possible move is espe-
cially poor, the tree can be cut at that point, eliminating all
of the computations that belong to its descendents. These
and other heuristics for accelerating computation have been
well studied in the literature [7]. They have been applied to
chess games to provide substantial speed-ups and to enable
much deeper searches since Claude Shannon’s seminal work
in 1950 [20].
7. CONCLUSIONS
We have shown that an application of game theoretic
methods can be used to analyze a more realistic cyber game
than has been heretofore been studied. In the process, we
created strategies that exploit searches of trees comprised
of possible moves. Using simple functions that evaluate the
value of any game situation together with a tree search-
ing capability, we showed that the resulting strategies can
produce intelligent, nuanced strategies. For example, the
resulting strategies took into account the player’s relative
advantage based on the quality of their exploits. Also, we
found that in cases of extreme uncertainty, it is often better
to ignore one’s opponent’s possible moves.
One area of interest worthy of further analysis is the inves-
tigation into the value of certainty. By creating an alterna-
tive evaluation function that adds some weight to the infor-
mation content in the knowledge of the game, the strategy
could emphasize an intrinsic value of learning the OS of com-
puters and the players on each machine. Such an evaluation
function might allow a 1-ply search to mimic the strategies
that were found to be so effective in the 2-ply No-Response
strategy.
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